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Motion to Suppress the presentation cf evidence jbtair.eo 
subsequent to an investigatory stop. Upon stipulation of the 
prosecutor, a conditional plea was entered in the Third 
Circuit Court after the Honorable Judge Paul Grant 
respectfully denied Defendant's Motion. The prosecution 
agreed to the conditional plea with the understanding that the 
right to appeal Judge Grant's denial of the Motion to 
Suppress was reserved. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
Did the arresting officer have specific articulable facts 
known to him at the time he stopped defendant's vehicle such 
that a reasonable person would conclude the defendant had 
committed or was about to commit a crime? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
United States Constitution Fourth Amendment. 
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 14. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-24 (2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals from a criminal conviction in the 
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Circuit Court. The conviction was based upon a stipulated 
conditional plea of guilty. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Circuit Court denied defendant's Motion to Suppress 
after an evidentiary hearing, which was held prior to trial on 
December 29, 1989. The parties then stipulated defendant 
could enter a conditional plea of guilty and preserve his 
rights to appeal. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence was entered on February 
1, 1990. Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on February 
12, 1990. 
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Defendant was convicted of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and operating a motor vehicle without a 
valid license after entering a conditional guilty plea. The 
plea was conditional in order to preserve his right to appeal 
challenging the Court's denial of his pretrial Motion to 
Suppress all evidence due to an illegal traffic stop. See, 
Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citing State v. Sew, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1987)). 
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The Court made specific findings concerning the conditional 
plea. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 27, 1989, a Salt Lake City police officer 
pulled up next to Defendant's vehicle on 200 West and 900 
South while the light was red. (See Trial Transcript, page 
6, hereafter T.6). When the light changed to green, the 
Defendant's car did not move for approximately thirty (30) 
seconds and then proceeded to go through the light. (T.6) 
The officer stopped the vehicle and parked behind it. (T.6) 
The stop was not based on any sort of driving pattern or 
other conduct. (T.ll) 
After the officer stopped the vehicle, the officer 
approached the Defendant's vehicle, which moved in reverse 
toward the officer's vehicle and then abruptly stopped. 
(T.18) The Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and driving without an 
operator's permit. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The police officer's stop of Defendant was a "seizure" 
subject to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution. An investigatory stop can be justified only 
upon a showing of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
Mr. McCullough had committed or was committing a crime or that 
he was stopped incident to a traffic offense. The officer 
could not reasonably suspect from the facts apparent to the 
officer at the time of the stop and from reasonable inferences 
drawn from those facts that Mr. McCullough was driving while 
intoxicated. The mere fact that the vehicle remained stopped 
at a traffic signal for 30 seconds after it turned green did 
not provide sufficient reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. 
McCullough. As there were no objective facts upon which the 
officer could base a reasonable suspicion that Mr. McCullough 
was driving while intoxicated at the time of the stop, the 
investigatory stop was illegal and any evidence derived 
therefrom should have been suppressed pursuant to Mr. 
McCullough's pretrial Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
OBJECTIVE FACTS APPARENT TO THE OFFICER 
WERE INSUFFICIENT TO REASONABLY SUSPECT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INTOXICATED AT THE 
TIME OF THE INVESTIGATORY STOP. 
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
5 
Constitution provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated.... 
The police officer's stop of the Defendant was a 
"seizure" subject to the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and to Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and absent certain limited exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, a warrantless seizure is presumptively 
unreasonable. See, Coolidqe v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971) . 
In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1980), the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
The Fourth Amendment'applies to seizures 
of the person, including brief 
investigatory stops such as the stop of 
the vehicle here. Reid v. Georgia, 448 
U.S. 438, 440 (1980); Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968). An 
investigatory stop must be justified by 
some objective manifestation that the 
person stopped is, or is about to be, 
engaged in criminal activity. Brown v._ 
Texas, 443, U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); 
United States v. Briqnoni-Pronce, supra, 
at 884; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
146-149 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 
16-19. 
The standard for investigatory stops is codified in Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-7-15: 
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A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing a public 
offense.... (emphasis added) 
Thus, an investigatory stop can be justified only upon a 
showing of reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had 
committed or was committing a crime or that he was stopped 
incident to a traffic offense. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2 972, 
975 (Utah App. 1988) . 
Hence, both the Legislature and the Courts adhere to the 
standard that an officer must have a reasonable suspicion to 
believe an individual has committed or is in the act of 
committing a crime. The reasonable suspicion must be 
articulable, meaning the officer must be able to explain the 
reasonable suspicion to others. In State v. Baumqaertel, 762 
P.2d 2, 4 (Utah App. 1988) (citing State v. Truiillo, 739 
P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987)), this court stated: 
To justify an "investigatory stop" or 
"seizure" that falls short of an official 
arrest, a peace officer "must point to 
specific, articulable facts which, 
together with rational inferences drawn 
from those facts, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude (the suspect) had 
committed or was about to commit a crime. 
Reasonable suspicion that a Defendant was intoxicated 
must be based upon facts apparent to the officer and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom for the officer to 
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reasonably suspect intoxication. Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 
P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Baird, 763 
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988)). Reasonable suspicion must 
be based upon articulated, "objective facts" apparent to the 
officer at the time of the stop. Thorsness, at 1012. (Cf. 
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989). Therefore, 
the test for an investigatory stop is based "not on the 
policeman's subjective theory, but whether the record 
discloses articulable objective facts were available to the 
officer to justify the stop." State v. Peck, 329 N.W.2d 
680, 686 (Iowa 1982) . 
The case of Sandy City v. Thorsnessr 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah 
App. 1989) is on point. In that case, a Sandy City police 
officer stopped an individual because it was late at night, 
1:30 a.m., the Defendant drove slowly in the inside lane and 
stopped alongside the officer's car failing to immediately 
move on when signaled to do so by the officer. This Court 
found that while the conduct may be indicative of a drunken 
driver when combined with other factors, such behavior was 
equally consistent with the habits and conduct of a normal 
driver. Thorsness at 1012. 
The officer in this case indicated that the only act of 
Mr. McCullough, observed by the officer prior to the stop, 
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pertained to Mr. McCullough's not moving through the green 
light for thirty (30) seconds after it had changed to a green 
light. (T.17) Under Utah Law pertaining to traffic and 
control signals, vehicular traffic facing a green signal may 
proceed: 
"(2) "Green" indicates: 
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a circular 
green signal may proceed straight through 
or turn right or left unless a sign at 
that place prohibits either turn...." 
U.C.A. Section 41-6-24 (2) (emphasis added). 
Defendant was not committing a traffic offense by not 
proceeding through the green light immediately. Such behavior 
is as equally consistent with the habits and conduct of a 
normal driver momentarily distracted as it is with that of a 
driver who is violating the law. 
The officer indicated in his testimony that he did not 
base the stop on any sort of driving pattern or any other 
conduct observed. (T.ll) The officer also indicated that 
after he had made the stop, Defendant's vehicle rolled back 
toward the officer's vehicle. (T.18) The officer admitted in 
testimony that the vehicle could have reversed due to 
mechanical difficulties. (T.19) 
The Defendant in this case was stopped solely on 
the basis of the fact that he did not proceed through the 
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green light for thirty (30) seconds after it had changed from 
red. 
Defendant's prolonged stop at the traffic light did not 
indicate a reckless, erratic driving pattern indicating a 
lack of vehicular control (T.ll) nor did it violate Utah Law 
regarding traffic control signals. The facts of this case 
are equally indicative of innocent behavior and without 
objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion, do not 
provide a reasonable basis to suspect Defendant was 
intoxicated. No evidence exists for a reasonable suspicion 
based upon articulated, "objective facts". Therefore, the 
police officer's stop of Mr. McCullough was a "seizure" 
subject to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and without reasonable suspicion, as articulated 
in Terry and Utah case law, subsequent evidence resulting in 
conviction should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully 
requests that the Trial Court's conviction of Defendant after 
the denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
pursuant to the traffic stop be reversed. Evidence obtained 
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subsequent to the unlawful seizure should be suppressed and 
excluded and the case remanded to the trial court for 
appropriate disposition. 
Dated this £<J day of &}
 r(l 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAW OFFICE OF PHILLIP W. DYER 
& ASSOCIATES 
Phillip W. Dyer C3?— 
Pamela C. Urry 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook) 
A. West patrol division. 
Q. Fine. Was your attention directed toward a 
Chevy truck, 1973, blue over white? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. What first attracted your attention to that 
vehicle? 
A. I don't — I pulled up next to it, I believe 
it was 200 West and 900 South, and — 
Q. And --
A. — the light — 
Q. — what color was the light at that time? 
A. The light was red at that time. 
Q. Okay. Did the light change to green? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. Okay. What did the other car do when the light 
changed to green? 
A. It did not move. 
Q. Can you estimate approximately how long it 
didn't move at the green light? 
A. I estimated 30 seconds. 
Q. Did the vehicle then go through the light? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. What action then did you take? 
A. I stopped the vehicle. Got behind it and 
called on the radio that I would be stopping the 
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer) 
violation before? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Okay. Based on your observation of the 
defendant waiting at that light, did you believe that he 
may have been impaired by the time — based on 
the time that he took to go through the light? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Nothing further of the witness, your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DYER: 
Q. Officer, is it your testimony then, as I 
understand it, that the basis for your investigation was 
the length of time that the vehicle was stopped at the 
intersection; is that correct? 
A. That's what initiated the investigation, 
that's not the basis of the rest of the investigation. 
Q. Okay, I'm with you. But that's the — that 
is the basis upon which you decided to stop 
Mr. McCullough's vehicle, correct? There was -- you 
didn't base it on any sort of a driving pattern or any 
other conduct that you observed? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And also is your testimony, if I'm not 
correct, that you said it is a violation of law to not 
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Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer) 
would be with unlawful conduct; is that not true? 
A. You mean lawful conduct --
Q. Yes. 
A. -- as unlawful conduct? 
Q. Correct. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the fact — by the way, what time of day 
did this occur? 
A. It was around 10 to 1. 
Q. Okay. So it was just after midnight then? 
A. Right, 50 minutes after. 
Q. Did that impact on your decision? 
A. It may have, I don't recall for sure. 
Q. So the only facts that impacted on your 
decision to pull the vehicle over was the fact of the 30 
second delay in proceeding through the intersection? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay, and once that vehicle had proceeded 
through at that point in time, you made the decision 
based on the information you had that you felt there was 
sufficient basis to pull the vehicle over? 
A. Correct. 
Q. After the vehicle was pulled over and you 
contacted the driver, were any field sobriety tests 
performed? 
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Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer) 
A. I demonstrated one. He declined to do it on 
the basis that he was too drunk to pass it. 
MR. DYER: Your Honor, I would move to strike 
the response as being nonresponsive. 
MR. COOK: Appears — 
MR. DYER: The question called for a yes or no 
answer. 
MR. COOK: Appeared to be responsive to us, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: I sustain. 
Q. And based on your observations of the 30 
second stop at the intersection, and the smell of 
alcohol on the individual's person and his appearance, 
that was your probable cause for arrest; is that 
correct? 
A. No. 
Q. 
rise to 
A. 
What additional 
probable cause for 
The fact that he 
I was approximately a 
my vehicle and was on 
approach his when his 
towards my vehicle. 
Without stopping 
towards 
car 
facts did you 
arrest? 
have to give 
pulled to the curb okay, and 
length behind him; I stopped 
my way out of my vehicle to 
vehicle, in reverse, started 
the 
my vehicle, he put 
vehicle which 
it in park. 
was rolling 
And you could 
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Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R. 
(WILLIAMS - Redirect by Cook) 
see the, you know, the instantaneous stop when he 
dropped from reverse into park, 
Q. Is that particular driving conduct consistent 
with a transmission problem? 
A. I don't know, I've never had a transmission 
problem like that before. 
Q. Is it possible it could be consistent with a 
transmission that won't — 
A. Well — 
Q. -- go into gear? 
A. I imagine it could be possible. 
MR. DYER: That's all I have, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. COOK: 
Q. To be clear, officer, you considered a number 
of factors before you placed the defendant under arrest; 
is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You mentioned previously slurred speech? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Poor balance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Odor of alcohol? 
A. Yes. 
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